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I. INTRODUCTION
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”2
For centuries, the Supreme Court has written opinions that have had a substantial
impact on the procedural and substantive law of our legal system. Through these
opinions, the Court addresses a particular issue in controversy and provides guidance
to the lower courts regarding how to dispose of the issue. Sometimes the issue is not
thoroughly examined in the Court opinion and lingering questions remain for the
lower courts to determine. The lower courts use the guidance provided from the
Court opinion, coupled with their own knowledge, to help resolve these lingering
questions.
The testimonial privilege between a psychotherapist and a patient is one such
issue that the Supreme Court has examined, but the Court has left lingering questions
for the lower courts to determine. In the landmark case of Jaffee v. Redmond,3 the
Supreme Court examined the issue of whether there is a testimonial privilege
between a psychotherapist and a patient. The Court held that a privilege exists, but
declined to define possible exceptions to the privilege.4 The Court did, however,
mention that there might be some possible situations where the privilege could be
circumscribed.5 The opinion has resulted in unanswered questions for the lower
courts regarding the possible situations where such an exception exists.
With little guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts have begun to
determine the situations where an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
is permissible. The appellate courts have been inconsistent in deciding whether to
acknowledge the various exceptions.6 Specifically, one disagreement is whether a
dangerous-patient exception is available when a patient has revealed information to a
psychotherapist regarding an intention to harm or kill a third party.7 The Tenth
2

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

3

518 U.S. 1 (1996).

4

Id. at 18.

5

Id. at 18 n.19.

6
Compare United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining “to
recognize a dangerous-patient exception to the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege”) with
United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that there is an exception
to the psychotherapist-patient privilege if “the threat was serious when it was uttered . . . [and]
its disclosure was the only means of averting harm”).
7

Compare Chase, 340 F.3d 978 with Glass, 133 F.3d 1356.
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Circuit, in United States v. Glass, recognized that “there are situations in which the
privilege must give way.”8 One situation is “if a serious threat of harm to the patient
or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.”9 The
Ninth Circuit, however, has recently refused to recognize the existence of a
dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.10 The Ninth
Circuit based its decision on four factors: (1) the “States’ Experiences”,11 (2) the
“Differing Purposes of State Confidentiality Laws and the Federal Testimonial
Privilege”,12 (3) the 1972 Proposed Rule to the Federal Rules of Evidence,13 and (4)
Public Policy.14
II. THE AUTHORITY TO CREATE A PRIVILEGE
The Supreme Court has the authority to create a privilege of a witness “governed
by the principles of common law . . . in the light of reason and experience.”15 In civil
cases, when state substantive law applies, the privilege of a witness is determined by
state law.16 Initially, the Supreme Court proposed to Congress specific privileges to
become statutory law.17 A privilege between a psychotherapist and a patient was one
of the specific proposed privileges.18 Congress determined not to establish specific
privileges, but to allow the Court to recognize privileges through case law and court
opinions.19
III. RECOGNIZING A PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The Supreme Court in Jaffee recognized a privilege between a psychotherapist
and patient based on Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.20 The privilege
prevents a psychotherapist from being compelled to testify in court regarding
information received from the patient during diagnosis or treatment.21 The Court
defined a “psychotherapist” to include licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, and
social workers.22
8

Glass, 133 F.3d at 1357.

9

Id.

10

Chase, 340 F.3d at 992.

11

Id. at 985. (emphasis in the original).

12

Id. at 986. (emphasis in the original).

13

Id. at 989.

14

Id. at 990.

15

FED. R. EVID. 501.

16

Id.

17

See FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note.

18

See id.

19

See id.

20

Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.

21

Id.

22

Id.
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In Jaffee, the petitioner, who was the administrator of the decedent’s estate, filed
a wrongful death suit in the district court against the respondent, a police officer,
contending that the officer used excessive force.23 The officer used force in response
to a police call reporting that a fight had commenced.24 The situation resulted in the
officer drawing her gun and fatally shooting an individual.25 The officer and
eyewitnesses presented conflicting testimony regarding the events that occurred
when the officer arrived at the scene.26 In order to clarify this discrepancy, the
petitioner sought to retrieve notes recorded by a social worker who counseled the
officer after the incident.27
The officer and the social worker refused to comply with the discovery requests
claiming that the information communicated by the officer to the social worker was
privileged.28 While instructing the jury, the district court stated that the members of
the jury could infer that the social worker’s notes contained harmful information
because of the refusal to comply with the discovery requests.29 The jury returned a
verdict for the petitioner.30 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of
the district court.31 The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in refusing
to exclude the communications because it was privileged under the psychotherapistpatient privilege.32 The circuit court based its decision on the unique relationship
between a psychotherapist and a patient requiring open communication for treatment,
a person’s right to privacy under the constitution, and the recognition of some form
of a privilege by all fifty states.33 The Seventh Circuit followed In re Zungia,34
which balanced the interests of disclosing the communication with the interests of
nondisclosure.35 The Circuit Court concluded that the interests of encouraging “law
enforcement officers who are frequently forced to experience traumatic events by the
very nature of their work to seek qualified professional help” outweighed the interest
in disclosing the confidential communications in this case.36

23

Id. at 5.

24

Id. at 4.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 5.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 5-6.

30

Id. at 6.

31

Id. at 6.

32

Id. at 6-7.

33

Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (7th Cir. 1995).

34

In re Zungia, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983).

35

Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357.

36

Id.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari37 to determine whether there is a
psychotherapist-patient privilege because of the discrepancies among the appellate
courts.38 The Court acknowledged that there is a psychotherapist-patient privilege.39
The Court based its reasoning on a number of principles, including the recognition of
some form of a psychotherapist-patient privilege by all fifty states;40 the necessity of
confidence and trust to effective psychotherapy;41 and the small “evidentiary benefit
that would result from the denial of the privilege.”42 The Court rejected the court of
appeals’ balancing test for determining whether there is an exception to the
privilege.43 Declining to establish exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the Court anticipated that there would be some situations “in which the
privilege must give way . . . .”44
IV. DEFINING THE CONTOURS OF RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS TO THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The Supreme Court clarified the issue of the psychotherapist-patient privilege by
declaring that such a privilege exists. The decision of the Court to refrain from
defining the perimeters of the privilege, however, provided the lower courts with the
opportunity to structure the boundaries of the privilege in light of their own reason
and experience. Like any other privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege must
be construed narrowly in order to ensure a fair trial.45 The federal appellate courts
and state legislatures have embraced this opportunity and have recognized numerous
exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.46
Recognized exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege include situations
when the patient’s mental state is at issue in the litigation,47 cases of involuntary

37

Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17.

38

See id. (citing United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Doe, 964
F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th
Cir. 1976) (refusing to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege)).
39

Id. at 15.

40

Id. at 12.

41

Id. at 10.

42

Id. at 11.

43

Id. at 17.

44

Id.

45

RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY IN LAW/LAW IN PSYCHIATRY 71 (Brunner-Routledge
2002) (stating that “[e]vidence is the basis of justice-the very essence of a fair trial.”). See,
e.g., Glass, 133 F.3d at 1357 (stating that “testimonial privileges thwarting the search for truth
should be narrowly construed”).
46

See Ellen W. Grabois, The Liability of Psychotherapists for Breach of Confidentiality, 12
J.L. & HEALTH 39, 59-60 (1997-98).
47

Id. (citing In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1970)).
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commitment,48 homicide cases,49 and criminal fraud cases.50 The appellate courts
have not universally adopted these exceptions to the privilege.
A. When the Mental State of the Patient is at Issue
The patient in the psychotherapist-patient relationship is the holder of the
privilege.51 The patient has the ability to “claim” the privilege in an attempt to
prevent confidential communications from being elicited at trial.52 The patient also
has the ability to waive the privilege, explicitly or implicitly, permitting confidential
communications to be revealed.53 “[T]he most common form of waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is . . . when [the patient’s] . . . condition is an
element of [a] claim or defense.”54
Numerous exceptions have been created in situations when the patient’s mental
condition is at “issue.” One exception to the privilege exists when there is a child
custody dispute between the parents.55 By disputing custody the parents have placed
their parental fitness in issue.56 In order to determine the best interests for the child
the court may have “access to therapy records and to the compelling testimony of the
therapist.”57 Another exception exists when the patient is a defendant in a criminal
case and raises the defense of insanity or mental illness.58 “The privilege is also
waived in a wrongful death action in which the party relies on the deceased’s
condition as an element of his claim or defense.”59 For example, an alleged victim’s
mental condition may be an issue if a party claims suicide was the cause of death and
not a result of the party’s actions.60
B. Involuntary Commitment Proceedings and Self Defense
The legislature has created an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
when the psychotherapist seeks to have the patient involuntarily hospitalized.61

48

Id. at 78.

49

Id. at 59-60 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 14.307(b)(1) (1995)).

50

In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 1999).

51

SLOVENKO, supra note 45, at 71.

52

Id. at 71-72.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 72.

55

Id. at 79.

56

Id. at 78-79.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 75.

59

Id. at 74.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 78.
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The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence commented,
“The interests of both patient and public call for a departure from
confidentiality in commitment proceedings.
Since disclosure is
authorized only when the doctor determines that hospitalization is needed,
control over disclosure is placed largely in the hands of a person in whom
the patient has already manifested confidence.”62
The legislature created an additional exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in situations where the patient has brought an action against the
psychotherapist.63
As the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence put it: “The
exception is required by considerations of fairness and policy when
questions arise out of dealings between attorney and client, as in cases of
controversy over attorney’s fees, claims of inadequacy of representation,
or charges of professional misconduct.”64
C. Homicide Cases
An exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege has been created when the
patient is the defendant in a criminal homicide case.65 The District of Columbia
statute which provides for such an exception, states as follows:
In the Federal courts in the District of Columbia and District of Columbia
courts a . . . mental health professional . . . may not be permitted, without
the consent of the person afflicted . . . to disclose any information,
confidential in its nature, that he has acquired in attending a client in a
professional capacity and that was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, whether the information was obtained from the client or from his
family or from the person or persons in charge of him.66
The statute provides for an exception in “criminal cases where the accused is
charged with causing the death of, or inflicting injuries upon, a human being, and the
disclosure is required in the interests of public justice . . . .”67
D. Criminal Fraud Cases
The First Circuit in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette)68 held
that there is a crime-fraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The
case involved alleged false statements made to various financial institutions by the

62

Id. (citing Proposed FED. R. EVID. 504).

63

Id. at 88.

64

Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 503 advisory committee’s note).

65

D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307(b) (2003).

66

Id. at § 14-307(a).

67

Id. at § 14-307(b).

68

183 F.3d 71.
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appellant regarding disabilities he had in order to obtain disability insurance.69 The
government sought to obtain testimony from two psychiatrists who had met with the
appellant and were used by him to fraudulently induce payments.70 The court
enforced the government’s subpoena despite the psychiatrists’ assertions of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.71 On appeal, the appellant contended that a crimefraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege did not exist.72 The court of
appeals rejected the appellant’s argument and held that there was an exception.73
Based on reason and experience, the court determined that there should be an
exception to the privilege in the case of criminal fraud.74 The court stated that the
opinion in Jaffee did not intend to create an absolute privilege, leaving the substance
of the privilege to be decided by future cases.75 The court reasoned that without the
acknowledgement of a crime-fraud exception, there is a potential for abuse between
patients and counselors.76 For example, “[p]sychotherapists could use the privilege
to deflect investigations into health insurance fraud.”77 The court also looked at the
similarity between the attorney-client privilege and the psychotherapist-patient
privilege because both relationships rely on a foundation of trust and confidence.78
The court stated that because courts have recognized a crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege to prevent future criminal activity, even though it is based
on trust and confidence, the court should also recognize an exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege to prevent future criminal activity, even though it
too is a relationship based on trust and confidence.79 The court detailed the elements
that must be satisfied in order for the exception to exist: (1) it must be shown “that
the client was engaged in (or was planning) criminal or fraudulent activity when the
attorney-client communications took place; and (2) that the communications were
intended by the client to facilitate or conceal the criminal or fraudulent activity.”80

69

Id. at 72.

70

Id. at 72-73.

71

Id. at 73.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 71.

74

Id.

75

Id. at 74.

76

Id. at 77.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 75-76.

79

Id.

80

Id. at 75 (citing United States v. Jacob, 117 F.3d 82, 87-89 (2d Cir. 1997)) (emphasis in
the original).
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V. AN ABRUPT HALT IN THE EXPANSION OF RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS:
UNITED STATES V. CHASE
The Ninth Circuit , in United States v. Chase,81 stopped the continuing expansion
of exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In Chase, the court declined
to recognize the dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.82 The Ninth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, reversed the decisions of
the district court and a three-judge panel of the court of appeals and concluded that
there is no such privilege.83
In Chase, the defendant, during numerous sessions, communicated to his
psychotherapist that he was planning to kill two FBI agents.84 The psychotherapist
warned the defendant of her duty to inform the agents of potential harm if she was
informed of the identities of the FBI agents.85 The psychotherapist sought the advice
of a superior regarding the threats.86 The supervisor advised her to learn more
information about the plan.87 Upon further contact with the defendant, the
The
psychotherapist feared that the defendant might institute his plan.88
psychotherapist once again sought advice from a superior and also sought advice
from legal counsel.89 As a result of the meeting, the psychotherapist contacted the
local authorities and the FBI agents.90 When the defendant became aware that he was
being investigated, he contacted the clinic where he was seeking treatment.91 He
spoke with two telephone operators and told them that “people are going to die” if
the FBI comes to arrest him.92 The defendant was arrested and charged with
threatening the agents who were en route to execute the search warrant and for
threatening to murder the two FBI agents.93 At trial, the defendant challenged the
admissibility of the psychotherapist’s testimony claiming the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.94 The district court admitted the testimony stating that the testimony was
not privileged because the defendant’s “threats were serious when uttered, that harm

81

Chase, 340 F.3d 978.

82

Id. at 992.

83

Id. at 981.

84

Id. at 979-80.

85

Id. at 980.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 979.

90

Id. at 980.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id. at 981.

94

Id.
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was imminent, and that disclosure to authorities was the only means of averting the
threatened harm.”95 The defendant was found guilty and he appealed.96
The three-judge panel of the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court recognizing the dangerous-patient exception.97 The three-judge panel found
the arguments recognizing an exception to the privilege more compelling than
disallowing the evidence by the psychotherapist altogether.98 The court stated that
the recognition of an exception is harmonious with the Court in Jaffee and policy
considerations.99 The court held that the dangerous-patient exception applies “when
(1) a threat of harm is serious and imminent and (2) the harm can be averted only by
means of disclosure by the therapist.”100
The Ninth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, declined to recognize a dangerouspatient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.101 The court first
addressed the decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,102 which held that a
psychotherapist has a duty to warn a third party or the authorities of potential harm
by a patient.103 The court distinguished between the rule established in Tarasoff,
permitting a psychotherapist to disclose confidential information in order to prevent
harm, and the dangerous-patient testimonial privilege, permitting a psychotherapist
to disclose confidential information in court.104 The court stated that because the
states have declined to adopt a dangerous-patient exception, for the federal courts to
recognize such an exception would impede upon the confidentiality laws of the
states.105
The court next considered the purposes of confidentiality laws and testimonial
privileges.106 The court reasoned that the disclosure of the confidences of a patient to
a psychotherapist when there is imminent harm to a third party is different than the
disclosure of confidences in a court proceeding.107 When the confidences are
disclosed in a trial proceeding the imminent danger no longer exists, therefore
obliterating the necessity to disclose confidential information in order to protect third
parties from harm.108
95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.; Chase, 301 F.3d 1019.

98

Chase, 301 F.3d at 1024.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Chase, 340 F.3d 978.

102

551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).

103

Chase, 340 F.3d at 985.

104

Id. at 985-86.

105

Id. at 986.

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 987.
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The third factor the court considered was the proposed rule to the Federal Rules
of Evidence.109 The proposed rule included nine privileges, including the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, and three exceptions, excluding from the rule the
dangerous-patient exception.110 The court considered this history as an indication of
the Supreme Court’s position regarding a dangerous-patient exception to the
privilege.111 The court’s final consideration was public policy.112 The court
emphasized the importance of confidence and trust between a psychotherapist and a
patient in order to have effective treatment.113 Based on the aforementioned factors,
the court declined to recognize a dangerous-patient exception.
VI. THE RATIONALE IN UNITED STATES V. CHASE FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE
NUMEROUS FACTORS THAT FAVOR THE RECOGNITION OF
A DANGEROUS-PATIENT EXCEPTION
In Chase, the Ninth Circuit considered four paramount reasons for concluding
that there should not be a dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege: (1) the “States’ Experiences”,114 (2) the “Differing Purposes of State
Confidentiality Laws and the Federal Testimonial Privilege”,115 (3) the 1972
Proposed Rule to the Federal Rules of Evidence,116 and (4) Public Policy.117 The
court, however, failed to address other factors that support the recognition of a
dangerous-patient exception. The court failed to acknowledge that (1) numerous
states have created legislative exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient exception
thereby impeding on state confidentiality laws; (2) the anticipated harm from the
Tarasoff decision regarding the psychotherapist-patient relationship was not realized;
(3) the proposed Rule to the Federal Rules of Evidence did not dismiss a dangerouspatient exception; and (4) public policy actually supports an exception.
A. States Have Carved Out Numerous Exceptions to the Privilege
The first factor considered in Chase was the experiences states have had creating
exceptions to state psychotherapist-patient privileges.118 The court stressed that
states’ experiences have opposed the adoption of a dangerous-patient exception and
should the courts create such an exception, the courts would impede upon state laws

109

Id. at 989.

110

Id.

111

Id. at 989-90.

112

Id. at 990.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 985. (emphasis in the original).

115

Id. at 986. (emphasis in the original).

116

Id. at 989.

117

Id. at 990.

118

Id. at 985.
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of confidentiality.119 The court concluded that the federal courts should not
recognize a dangerous-patient privilege because the states have not done so.120
Although not creating a specific dangerous-patient exception, state legislatures
have impeded the state privilege by creating numerous exceptions to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege based on societal needs and public policy. One
such exception to the privilege is contained in New York State Social Services
Law.121 The law requires certain individuals, including psychologists and social
workers,
to report or cause a report to be made . . . when they have reasonable
cause to suspect that a child coming before them in their professional or
official capacity is an abused or maltreated child, or . . . the parent,
guardian, custodian or other person legally responsible for such child
comes before them in their professional or official capacity . . . .122
New York law further provides that “[w]ritten reports from persons or officials
required by this title to report shall be admissible in evidence in any proceedings
relating to child abuse or maltreatment.”123
The State of Washington allows confidential communications to be divulged if it
is “[t]o appropriate law enforcement agencies and to a person, when the identity of
the person is known to the public or private agency, whose health and safety has
been threatened, or who is known to have been repeatedly harassed, by the
patient.”124 Here, “a therapist has permission to disclose conversations if the patient
has repeatedly harassed someone, even if the psychotherapist does not think that the
patient presents a ‘serious danger of violence.’”125
An Illinois statute allows a therapist to refuse to reveal confidential information
with the following exceptions: (1) when “the recipient introduces his mental
condition or any aspect of his services received for such condition as an element of
his claim or defense . . .”,126 (2) “after the recipient’s death when the recipient’s
physical or mental condition has been introduced as an element of a claim or defense
by any party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the recipient
. . .”,127 (3) “to determine a recipient’s competency or need for guardianship . . .”,128
(4) “when disclosure is necessary to collect sums or receive third party payment

119

Id. at 985-86.

120

Id. at 986.

121

N.Y. SOC. SERV. Law § 413(1) (McKinney 2003).

122

Id.

123

Id. at § 415.

124

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.390(10) (West 2004); see, e.g., Chase, 340 F.3d at

987.
125

Chase, 340 F.3d at 987; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.390(10).

126

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10(a)(1) (West 2004).

127

Id. at 110/10(a)(2).

128

Id. at 110/10(a)(5).
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representing charges for mental health or developmental disabilities services
provided by a therapist or agency to a recipient . . . .”129
Even though state legislatures have not specifically created a dangerous-patient
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the legislatures have demonstrated
that the privilege must give way in certain circumstances. These statutes
demonstrate that societal interests are of paramount concern and the confidentiality
between a psychotherapist and a patient can be curtailed in pursuit of those interests.
B. The Purpose of the Testimonial Privilege Versus State Confidentiality Laws
The court in Chase stated that the necessity for the disclosure of confidential
information regarding a dangerous patient is no longer present at trial.130 This
argument is flawed for three reasons. First, there are states that permit a
psychotherapist to testify in court even after the potential victim has been warned.
Second, there are circumstances in which a patient has to be involuntary committed
to an institution in order to prevent harm to a potential victim. In those situations,
the psychotherapist must provide testimony to convince the court that the individual
should be committed against his will. Finally, there are circumstances where the
only evidence available in order to convict a defendant of harming or attempting to
harm an individual is testimony from the psychotherapist.
Focusing on the first point, under Ohio’s state law “[a] school guidance
counselor . . . a professional clinical counselor, professional counselor, social
worker, independent social worker, marriage and family therapist or independent
marriage and family therapist . . . [or] a social work assistant . . .”131 shall not testify
“concerning a confidential communication received from a client in that relation or
the person’s advice to a client unless132 . . . [t]he communication or advice indicates
clear and present danger to the client or other persons.”133 Here, Ohio law permits a
psychotherapist to testify in court even after a potential victim has been warned.
Second, the court in United States v. Hayes,134 stated that “psychotherapists will
sometimes need to testify in court proceedings, such as those for the involuntary
commitment of a patient, to comply with their ‘duty to protect’ the patient or
identifiable third parties.”135 The court in Chase also conceded that “[s]tates
generally allow psychotherapists to testify in civil commitment proceedings . . . .”136
In addition, Chase cited to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d)(1) which
provides that “[t]here is no privilege under this rule for communications relevant to
an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the
psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the

129

Id. at 110/10(a)(12).
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Chase, 340 F.3d at 987.
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(G)(1) (West 2004).
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Id.
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patient is in need of hospitalization.”137 South Carolina has enacted a statute which
allows a patient to prevent a therapist from disclosing information disclosed in
confidence unless it involves “involuntary commitment proceedings, when a patient
is diagnosed by a qualified professional as in need of commitment to a mental health
facility for care of the patient’s mental illness . . . .”138 In situations where a therapist
institutes involuntary commitment proceedings against an individual, the therapist
must provide the respective information to the court by testifying.
Finally, there will be some situations in which the only evidence against the
defendant is the testimony offered by the psychotherapist.139 There may be some
instances where the psychotherapist is the only witness who can testify to the
patient’s alleged threats to harm another individual. In those circumstances, courts
should be permitted to allow the psychotherapist to testify in order to secure a
conviction against the patient.
C. The Proposed Rule to the Federal Rules of Evidence
The rule proposed by the Supreme Court to Congress regarding witness
privileges was substantially different than the rule Congress actually enacted.140 The
Court proposed nine federal privileges; however, Congress decided not to delineate
specific privileges.141 One proposed privilege provided that “[a] patient has a
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing
confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his
mental or emotional condition . . . .”142 The proposed exceptions to this proposed
privilege were as follows:
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule
for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the
patient for mental illness . . . . (2) Examination by order of judge. If the
judge orders an examination of the mental or emotional condition of the
patient . . . . (3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no
privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the
mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which
he relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense . . . .143
In Chase, the majority opinion argues against the adoption of a dangerous-patient
exception because the Supreme Court had not recognized a dangerous-patient

137

Id. (citing Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 504(d)(1)).

138

S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-22-90(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. 2004); see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1004 (West 2004) (stating that there “is no privilege . . . in a proceeding to commit the
patient . . . because of his alleged mental or physical condition.”).
139

See Chase, 340 F.3d at 998 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (stating in many instances the
psychotherapist’s testimony may be the only credible testimony at trial).
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exception in the proposed rule.144 Although a dangerous-patient exception was not
listed among the proposed exceptions to the privilege, the Chase court failed to
mention the exceptions that have been adopted by courts, which were not mentioned
in the proposed exceptions. For example, the crime-fraud exception to the privilege
was not listed in the proposed exceptions; courts have, nonetheless recognized it as
an exception. Regardless, Congress declined to adopt the Supreme Court’s proposed
rules or proposed exceptions.
D. Public Policy
The theory that a patient will refuse to disclose everything to his psychotherapist
because of fear that the psychotherapist may later use it against him has not been
realized. First, even if the psychotherapist were prohibited from testifying in court,
the psychotherapist would still be permitted to reveal the communications to the
authorities or to the potential victim. The majority opinion in Chase argues that the
psychotherapist-patient relationship would be severely tarnished if a psychotherapist
were permitted to divulge what the patient had communicated to him in
confidence.145 However, as Judge Kleinfeld so eloquently stated in the concurring
opinion “[t]he cat being already out of the bag, trial is no occasion for stuffing it
The majority of courts and legislatures have agreed that a
back in.”146
psychotherapist is permitted to divulge confidential communications in order to warn
the authorities and/or a potential victim. By warning others, the psychotherapist has
Therefore, the
already breached the psychotherapist-patient relationship.147
anticipated harm caused to the psychotherapist-patient relationship has already been
realized.
When the decision was published in Tarasoff, there was concern that patients
would no longer seek the necessary psychiatric treatment because of the possibility
that confidential communications may be revealed by the psychotherapist.148 The
mental health profession did not welcome the decision at first, believing that it would
“unduly compromise confidentiality and interfere with treatment.”149 Nonetheless, it
is “now clear that the concerns about the potential loss of confidentiality have not
had the adverse impact on psychiatric practice that . . . [was] predicted.”150 “[M]ore
than 25 years later . . . such a chilling effect or detrimental impact upon therapy has
not occurred.”151 This cause for concern regarding the dissolution of the
psychotherapist-patient relationship, providing that a therapist is permitted to testify
in court, will also not be realized. A therapist being allowed to testify in court will
144
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Brian Crowley, Measures to Take After Diagnosis of Violence or Danger, PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES, July 1, 2003, at 15.
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Tarasoff, 21 J. LEG. MED. 187, 214 (2000).
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not be the determinate factor for a patient when deciding whether or not to seek
treatment. Similar to the concern after the Tarasoff decision, the concern here will
also not be realized.
Another public policy concern is the possibility of a psychotherapist facing civil
liability to a patient if the psychotherapist reveals confidential communications.
States have anticipated this concern and have created statutes to protect
psychotherapists from being sued by their patients when psychotherapists reveal
confidential communications. For example, the Utah Legislature has enacted a
statute which states that “[a] therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to
provide protection from any violent behavior of his client or patient, except when
that client or patient communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical
violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim.”152 The statute
continues that “[n]o cause of action arises against a therapist for breach of trust or
privilege, or for disclosure of confidential information, based on a therapist’s
communication of information to a third party in an effort to discharge his duty in
accordance with Subsection (1).”153
VI. COURTS HAVE RECOGNIZED A DANGEROUS-PATIENT EXCEPTION
The decision in Chase did not resolve the question of whether the courts should
recognize a dangerous-patient exception. The question lingers while a number of
other courts are addressing the issue. Ultimately, the Supreme Court will determine
the issue; until then, the courts can rely on the guidance and wisdom of other courts.
One court has specifically recognized a dangerous-patient exception.154 Other courts
have indicated that there are circumstances where such an exception would exist.155
A. United States v. Glass
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Glass156 recognized the dangerous-patient
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In Glass, the defendant was
voluntarily seeking treatment for his mental illness at a mental institution.157 While
seeking treatment, the defendant admitted to a psychotherapist that he intended to
shoot Bill and Hillary Clinton.158 Notwithstanding this threat, the defendant was
released from the institution on the condition that he remained at his father’s
home.159 Upon discovering that the defendant failed to comply with the condition,
the psychotherapist informed the authorities of the defendant’s statement.160 The
152
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Id. at § 78-14a-102(2).
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See Glass, 133 F.3d 1356.
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See, e.g., Hayes, 227 F.3d at 578; United States v. Bishop, No. 97-1175, 1998 WL
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defendant was charged with “knowingly and willfully threatening to kill the
President of the United States.”161
The defendant moved to prohibit the use of the psychotherapist’s statement at
trial asserting the psychotherapist-patient privilege established in Jaffee.162 The
government contended that the evidence should be admitted based on the Supreme
Court’s suggestion in Jaffee that exceptions exist.163 The government premised its
argument on a footnote in the Jaffee opinion, which stated that that the court does
“not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for
example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by
means of a disclosure by the therapist.”164 The Glass court interpreted this statement
by the Supreme Court to establish an exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in situations where there is a “serious threat of harm to the patient or to
others [and the harm] can be averted only be means of a disclosure by the
therapist.”165 The court therefore remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether “the threat was serious when it was uttered and whether its disclosure was
the only means of averting harm to the President when the disclosure was made.”166
B. United States v. Hayes
During psychotherapy sessions, the defendant, Hayes, informed his
psychotherapist of his intention to harm his supervisor at work in the U.S. Postal
Office.167 The therapist warned the potential victim.168 The potential victim
requested to obtain all of the therapy records regarding Hayes’ treatment.169 The
therapist provided the records and Hayes was charged with threatening to kill a
federal official.170 At trial, Hayes filed a motion to preclude these therapy records
from being entered into evidence and further to prevent his therapist from
testifying.171 Citing Glass, “the district court held that a psychotherapist may testify
as to otherwise privileged statements of threats allegedly made by a patient only
where such ‘disclosure was the only means of averting harm to the [federal official]
when the disclosure was made.’”172 The court granted the defendant’s motion
finding that the “disclosure was not ‘the only way of averting harm.’”173 The court
161
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based its decision on testimony by the therapist indicating that he did not consider
any other avenue besides disclosing the confidential information.174 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. In its opinion, the court expressed
that it did not support the adoption of a dangerous-patient exception. The court did,
however, acknowledge that in some circumstances the privilege may be waived.175
The court stated that “in order to secure a valid waiver of the protections of the
psychotherapist/patient privilege from a patient, a psychotherapist must provide that
patient with an explanation of the consequences of that waiver suited to the unique
needs of that patient.”176 A patient can waive the privilege “by disclosing the
substance of therapy sessions to unrelated third parties.”177 The court further stated
that it was not creating a test to determine whether the privilege had been waived,
but that it would be determined on a case-by-case basis.178 Nonetheless, the court
concluded that the defendant had not waived his privilege in this case.179
C. United States v. Bishop
In United States v. Bishop,180 the defendant, Bishop, was convicted of murdering
an individual at the psychiatric hospital.181 During the investigations of the incident,
Bishop informed officers that he had committed the crime.182 At trial, asserting the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, Bishop objected to the testimony of a doctor and
nurse to whom he had told incriminating statements.183 The district court denied the
motion because Bishop had waived the privilege by previously disclosing that
information to law enforcement officials.184 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the
district court, holding Bishop had waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege by
disclosing the information to a third party.185
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court “in light of [its] reason and experience”186 has
recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Court has, however, left
lingering questions for the lower courts to determine regarding possible exceptions to
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the privilege. The lower courts have used their own reason and experience to
develop exceptions to the privilege. Such exceptions include the crime-fraud
exception, waiver exception, and the dangerous-patient exception. “Inevitably other
exceptions will follow . . . .”187 The Supreme Court should recognize a dangerouspatient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege to allow a psychotherapist
to testify in court when there is “a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others”
and it can only be averted “by means of disclosure by” the therapist.188 The Court
should recognize the exception because it would not impede on state confidentiality
laws, it would not impede on the confidential psychotherapist-patient relationship,
Congress did not dismiss this exception, and the exception is supported by public
policy.
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